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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This case arises out of a series of disputed real estate transactions between Richard 
Giesler and Idaho Trust Deeds, LLC (collectively, "Giesler") and Gregory Hull ("Hull"). Giesler 
timely appeals from the Judgment entered by the District Court of June 27, 2013 (the 
"Judgment"), finally adjudicating the rights and obligations of the parties with respect to the 
ownership and development of a 107 -acre parcel of real property more particularly described 
therein (the "Property"). The Judgment is supported by the District Court's findings of fact and 
conclusions oflaw contained in its Memorandum Opinion entered June 27,2013 (the 
"Memorandum Opinion"). Giesler raises several issues concerning the District Court's holdings 
that were inconsistent with the relief requested by the parties or other findings of the District 
Court, unsupported by evidence in the record, or contrary to applicable legal standards. 
B. Course of Proceedings 
Hull filed a Verified Complaint against Giesler on May 23,2012 (the "Complaint") 
alleging (1) that he had an undivided one-half interest in the Property; (2) Giesler was only 
conveyed title to the Property to be held in trust; and (3) that Hull was wrongfully evicted from 
his farming operations on the Property pursuant to an oral lease agreement. (R. at 6-14). 
Accordingly, Hull requested that (1) he be restored to his leasehold possession or awarded 
damages; (2) the Court declare that the Property was held by Giesler in an express trust and that 
Giesler be required to deed back a one-half interest in the Property to Hull; (3) that the Court 
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declare that one-half of the Property be held in a resulting trust in favor of Hull; and (4) that the 
Court declare that the Property be held in constructive trust in favor of Hull. (R. at 14-15). 
Giesler denied the allegations of the Complaint by its Answer, Counterclaim, and 
Demand for Jury Trial filed on September 12, 2012 (the "Answer and Counterclaim"). (R. at 
49). The Answer and Counterclaim raised, among other defenses, the affirmative defenses of 
statute of frauds and merger as a bar to the relief requested by the Complaint. The Answer and 
Counterclaim also raised allegations against Hull for (1) breach of contract and unjust 
enrichment arising out of Hull's failure to pay certain loans, farm rent and expenses, and other 
miscellaneous expenses; (2) conversion arising out of Hull's removal of certain irrigation 
equipment from the Property that was included in the original sale of the Property; and (3) 
unlawful detainer arising out of Hull's continued possession of the Property. (R. at 53-57). The 
parties resolved the unlawful detainer issue shortly after the filing of the Answer and 
Counterclaim. 
The parties entered a Stipulation for Scheduling and Planning on September 21, 2012, 
which provided that all motions to amend claims between the parties must be filed on or before 
150 days prior to trial. (R. at 64). Trial was set to begin on June 4, 2013. The minutes from a 
pre-trial conference on May 6, 2013, reflect that the trial date would not be re-set. (R. at 108). 
On May 10,2013, Hull filed a Motion to Amend Complaint. (R. at 109). On May 14,2013, 
Giesler filed its Objection to Motion to Amend and, in the Alternative, Motion to Vacate Trial 
Setting, arguing that, in addition to the original claims alleging the creation of a trust (express, 
resultant and constructive), Hull's Motion to Amend sought to add additional claims for breach of 
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contract (including an oral subdivision/development agreement between the parties), unjust 
enrichment, and partition, among others. (R. at 119). At a second pre-trial conference on May 
15,2013, as reflected in the court minutes (R. at 131) and the Pre-Trial Order (R. at 147), the 
District Court granted Hull's Motion to Amend over Giesler's objection, deemed all allegations 
therein denied by the Giesler, and denied Giesler's Motion to Vacate the Trial. Later that day, 
Hull filed his Amended Complaint. (R. at 132). 
The case was tried to the District Court on June 4 through June 6, 2013, following which 
the District Court entered its Memorandum Opinion and Judgment in due course. Shortly 
thereafter, the parties filed competing motions for attorney's fees and costs, which was heard on 
January 6,2014, and taken under advisement. On August 6,2013, the Giesler filed a timely 
Notice of Appeal from the Judgment. (R. at 247). Giesler seeks relief pursuant to the issues 
raised by this Appellant's Brief. 
C. Statement of Facts 
The following is a summary of pertinent facts as found by the District Court in the 
Memorandum Opinion. (R. at 188). 
1. Real Estate Purchase and Sale 
Hull owned the Property, an additional40-acre parcel which was subdivided and settled 
by the parties prior to the current litigation (the "40-acre Parcel," and together with the Property, 
the "147 Acres"), 147 water shares of Twin falls Canal Company appurtenant to the 147 Acres 
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(the "Water Rights,,)1, and irrigation equipment located on the 147 Acres used for irrigating of 
the 147 Acres (the "Irrigation Equipment,,).2 (Memorandum Opinion at 2, 6; R. at 189, 193). 
The parties entered into negotiations to purchase the 147 Acres and, on January 10,2005, 
entered into a Commercial/Investment Real Estate Purchase and Sale Agreement (the "Purchase 
and Sale Agreement") (See Giesler's Exhibit 4) providing that Hull would sell to Giesler 
approximately 150 acres for $375,000.00. (Memorandum Opinion, 3-4; R. at 190-91). By its 
terms, the Purchase and Sale Agreement included all irrigation fixtures and equipment, water, 
water rights, ditches, and ditch rights appurtenant to the 147 Acres, or that were then located on 
or used in connection with the 147 Acres. Id. Subsequently, on January 28, 2005, the parties 
executed an Addendum to the Purchase and Sale Agreement (the "Addendum") specifying the 
total acreage to be 147 acres, reducing the purchase price to $367,500 and extending the closing 
date to March 28,2005 and later to April 23, 2005. Id.; see also Giesler's Exhibit 3 and 4. The 
Purchase and Sale Agreement contained a standard integrationimerger clause precluding any 
other agreement or understanding between the parties at that time outside of the written 
agreement. (Memorandum Opinion at 4; R. at 191; see also Giesler's Exhibit 4). 
At closing, Giesler paid Hull the purchase price of$367,500 for the 147 Acres, Water 
Rights and Irrigation Equipment. (Memorandum Opinion at 4; R. at 191). In order to secure 
1 The District Court noted that there were 160 water shares appurtenant to the real property, but declined to award 
more than one share per acre. As noted in footnote 7 of the Memorandum Opinion, the District Court acknowledged 
that 147 water shares were absolutely appurtenant to the property and concluded that whether the remaining 13 
water shares were transferred pursuant to documents executed with the Twin Falls Canal Company was not at issue 
in this litigation. (Memorandum Opinion at 6, n. 7; R. at 193). 
2 The District Court also found that Respondent stored additional irrigation equipment on the 147 Acres necessary to 
irrigate approximately 700 acres of additional farm ground owned by Respondent. But, the District Court found and 
Appellant herein only refers to the irrigation equipment located on the 147 Acres that was necessary to irrigate only 
the 147 Acres. (Memorandum Opinion at 3,25-26; R. at 190,212-13). 
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adequate funds, Giesler took out a loan of$183,748 from D.L. Evans Bank, evidenced by four 
separate promissory notes in the original principal amounts of$27,490, $54,147, $54,147 and 
$49,766 (collectively, the "DL Evans Notes,,).3 (Memorandum Opinion at 4-5; R. at 191-92). 
Each of the DL Evans Notes was secured by a different portion of the 147 acres. !d. The 
aggregate annual payment on the DL Evans Notes equaled $20,107.46 and was due on April 
20th each year, beginning on April 20, 2006. Id. At closing on April 21,2005, Hull executed a 
Warranty Deed to Giesler covering the entire 147 Acres, which contained no reservation or other 
restriction concerning any interest retained by Hull in any of the 147 Acres. (Memorandum 
Opinion at 4,6; R. at 191, 193). Accordingly, the District Court found that all of Hull's legal 
interest in the 147 Acres, the Water Rights and the Irrigation Equipment was transferred to 
Giesler on that date. (Memorandum Opinion at 6; R. at 193). 
2. Subdivision / Development Agreement 
Sometime after these events, the parties entered into a verbal agreement whereby Giesler 
would develop the 147 Acres, market the lots and equally divide the net profits, if any, with Hull 
after accounting for Giesler's development costs. (Memorandum Opinion at 6-11; R. at 193-98). 
For his part, Hull agreed to make the payments on the DL Evans Notes as they carne due, in 
order to receive his future interest in the net profits. Id. The 40-Acre Parcel was subdivided first 
and, rather than wait for each lot to be sold, the parties negotiated an up-front $200,000 buy-out 
of Hull's interest in the net profits in the 40-Acre Parcel. (Memorandum Opinion at 7-8; R. at 
3 As found by the District Court, the total of these notes actually equals $185,550. The difference between the total 
of the four notes and the amount applied to the purchase price is due to various settlement charges. (Memorandum 
Opinion at 5 n.3; R. at 192). 
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194-95). The Property, consisting of the remaining 107 acres, was then left as the sole subject of 
the parties' disputations concerning real estate development. Following the completion of the 
40-Acre Parcel, real estate market conditions declined. (Memorandum Opinion at 19; R. at 206). 
Regarding steps taken to develop the Property, Giesler platted a portion of the Property (but did 
not receive a final plat because no infrastructure improvements had been made) and prepared a 
draft subdivision plat for another portion of the Property. (Memorandum Opinion at 18-19; R. at 
205-06). The parties did not agree to any time for performance of this oral development 
agreement. (Memorandum Opinion at 19-20; R. at 206-07). 
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IV. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Whether the district court erred by holding that Hull retained any interest in the 147 Acres, 
Water Rights or Irrigation Equipment, equitable or otherwise. 
Whether the District Court erred by fashioning a remedy for breach of contract when Hull had 
failed to sufficiently prove actual or anticipated damages with reasonable certainty and when the 
District Court's remedies were outside of the relief requested by Hull, unsupported by evidence 
in the record or were unreasonable, arbitrary and unenforceable. 
Whether the District Court erred by only awarding Giesler one half of the value of the Irrigation 
Equipment and also ordering that the pro rata value of the Irrigation Equipment be factored into 
the calculation of "net profits" from the sale of subdivided lots. 
Whether Giesler is entitled to Costs and Attorney's Fees on appeal pursuant to the Purchase and 
Sale Agreement and Idaho law, including I.A.R. 41, I.C. § 12-120(3) and/or I.C. § 12-121. 
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v. 
ARGUMENT 
A. Standard of Review 
When reviewing a trial court's conclusions following a bench trial, the appellate court's 
review is limited to ascertaining whether the evidence supports the findings of fact, and whether 
the findings support the conclusions oflaw. See Borah v. McCandless, 147 Idaho 73, 77, 205 
P.3d 1209, 1213 (2009). "Since it is the province of the trial court to weigh conflicting evidence 
and testimony and to judge the credibility of witnesses, this Court will liberally construe the trial 
court's findings of fact in favor of the judgment entered." Id. These findings of fact will not be 
set aside unless the trial court's findings are clearly erroneous. Ransom v. Topaz Mktg., L.P., 143 
Idaho 641, 643, 152 P.3d 2, 4 (2006). "If the trial court based its findings on substantial 
evidence, even if the evidence is conflicting, this Court will not overturn those findings on 
appeal." Borah, 147 Idaho at 77, 205 P.3d at 1213. Furthermore, appellate court should not 
substitute its view ofthe facts for that ofthe trial court. Ransom, 143 Idaho at 643, 152 P.3d at 
4. However, this Court exercises free review over a district court's conclusions oflaw. See 
Hoagland v. Ada County, 154 Idaho 900,906-07,303 P.3d 587.593-94 (2013). 
B. Whether the district court erred by holding that Hull retained any interest in 
the 147 Acres, Water Rights or Irrigation Equipment, equitable or otherwise. 
As a preliminary matter, Giesler first contends that the Purchase and Sale Agreement and 
the executed Warranty Deed constitute a full and final conveyance of all of Hull's interest in and 
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to the 147 Acres, Water Rights and Irrigation Equipment. The District Court agreed with this 
conclusion, at least in part, when it held: 
The contract, warranty deed, and closing statement are unequivocal, and the Court 
finds as a fact and as a matter oflaw that all of Hull's legal interest in the 147 acre 
parcel, certain irrigation equipment and 147 water shares were transferred to 
Giesler as of closing on April 21, 2005. The integration clause in the written 
agreement clearly states that even ifthere was discussion concerning Hull's 
intentions regarding ownership of these items that such agreements as asserted by 
Hull are disavowed by the contract and merged into the deed. 
(Memorandum Opinion at 6, R. at 193) (emphasis in original). However, the District Court also 
held: 
There is evidence in the record, as will be more fully discussed, which supports 
Hull's assertion that he retained some type of interest in the property, but there is 
no documentary evidence in the record signed by either party that he retained a 
legal interest in the real estate, the irrigation equipment, or the water shares. 
Nevertheless, the Court finds that the parties entered into a verbal agreement 
sometime after execution of the original real estate contract and before March 
2006 whereby Giesler agreed to give Hull a contingent 112 interest in the 147 
parcel. 
(Memorandum Opinion at 6, R. at 193) (emphasis in original). Therefore, according to the 
District Court, Hull transferred his legal interest to the 147 Acres, Water Rights and Irrigation 
Equipment, but retained some interest in the land. To the extent the District Court held that Hull 
retained any "equitable" or other interest in the land, this holding is not consistent with the other 
factual findings of the District Court and applicable legal principles. 
As found by the District Court, the Purchase and Sale Agreement contained a full 
merger/integration clause as follows: 
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27. ENTIRE AGREEMENT: This agreement, including any Addendums or 
exhibits, constitutes the entire Agreement between the parties and no warranties, 
including any warranty of habitability or representations have been made or shall 
be binding upon either party unless herein set forth. 
(Memorandum Opinion at 4, R. at 191). Regarding integration clauses, this Court has recently 
held: 
If a written contact is complete upon its face and unambiguous, and no party 
alleges any fraud or mistake, "extrinsic evidence of prior or contemporaneous 
negotiations or conversations is not admissible to contradict, vary, alter, add to, or 
detract from the terms of the contract." 
City o/Meridian v. Petra Inc., 299 P.3d 232, 242 (2013) quoting Howard v. Perry, 141 Idaho 
139, 141, 106 P.3d 465, 467 (2005). This Court further held that "[t]he merger clause is not 
merely a factor to consider in deciding whether the agreement is integrated: it proves the 
agreement is integrated." Id. quoting Howard, 141 Idaho at 142, 106 P.3d at 468. 
In Cristo Viene Pentecostal Church v. Paz, 144 Idaho 304, 160 P.3d 743 (2007), this 
Court considered a potentially inequitable situation involving competing versions of an 
agreement, and the Court held that the written agreement with the integration clause controlled. 
The Cristo Viene Church claimed that it had an agreement with Paz to buy back certain real 
property purchased by Paz allegedly on the church's behalf. Paz presented a written agreement 
to the church, containing an integration clause, that created a lease with option to purchase 
instead. When the church failed to timely exercise its option to purchase, Paz refused to sell at 
the agreed upon purchase price and the church brought suit. In affirming a judgment denying the 
church relief, this Court held: 
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[T]he purpose of [the merger clause] is to establish that the writing constituted the 
parties' entire agreement and superseded all prior informal understandings .... 
Any informal agreement the parties may have reached regarding the subject 
property was superseded by the written agreement and cannot now be relied upon 
to alter or change its plain language. 
Cristo Viene, 144 Idaho at 308-09,160 P.3d at 747-78 (internal citation omitted). 
The Purchase and Sale Agreement contains no mention of any other agreement or 
reservation of any right or interest by Hull in and to the property sold thereunder. The District 
Court agreed when it found that "there [was] no documentary evidence in the record signed by 
either party that [Hull] retained a legal interest in the real estate ... " (Memorandum Opinion at 
6, R. at 193). However, a review of the Purchase and Sale Agreement reveals that there was no 
evidence of any reservation or other indication of any retained interest in favor of Hull 
whatsoever. See Giesler Exhibit 4. This would be consistent with the District Court's holding, 
quoted above, that the parties entered into an additional, verbal agreement regarding 
development of the acreage sometime after execution of the Purchase and Sale Agreement. 
Accordingly, to the extent the District Court's findings imply that Hull retained any interest in 
the Property, such findings are not supported by substantial evidence. Because the Purchase and 
Sale Agreement is fully integrated and contains no mention of any reservation of any interest in 
the 147 Acres, the Water Rights or the Irrigation Equipment, then all of Hull's interest in such 
property was transferred thereby. 
The full and absolute conveyance of the 147 Acres, the Water Rights and the Irrigation 
Equipment is further supported by the execution and delivery of the Warranty Deed on April 21, 
2005, which was recorded that same day as Instrument No. 2005-008310 in Twin Falls County. 
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See Giesler Exhibit 8. At that point, the merger doctrine would foreclose any agreements, 
written or oral, predating the executed deed. Regarding the applicability of the merger doctrine 
in this context, this Court has held: 
[T]he acceptance of a deed to premises generally is considered as a merger of the 
agreements of an antecedent contract into the terms of the deed, and any claim for 
relief must be based on the covenants or agreements contained in the deed, not 
the covenants or agreements as contained in the prior agreement. 
Fuller v. Callister, 150 Idaho 848, 853,252 P.3d 1256, 1261 (2011) quoting Jolley v. Idaho 
Securities, Inc., 90 Idaho 373, 378, 414 P.2d 879,881 (1966) (emphasis added). This Court 
recognized exceptions for the merger doctrine relating to collateral stipulations of the contract, 
however, in this case, there are no such collateral stipulations applicable to Hull's claims to have 
an interest in the Property. This Court also acknowledged: "[ w ] here the right claimed under the 
contract would vary, change, or alter the agreement in the deed itself, or inheres in the very 
subject-matter with which the deed deals, a prior contract covering the same subject-matter 
cannot be shown as against the provisions of the deed." Fuller, 150 Idaho at 853, 252 P.3d at 
1261 quoting Sells v. Robinson, 141 Idaho 767, 772, 118 P.3d 99, 104 (2005). Therefore, the 
execution and delivery ofthe Warranty Deed implicates the merger doctrine which forecloses 
any argument of prior or contemporaneous agreements or understandings relating to the 147 
Acres and the Water Rights as of the closing date on April 21, 2005, whether written or oral. 
Accordingly, the integration clause in the Purchase and Sale Agreement foreclosed any 
prior or contemporaneous agreements related to the 147 Acres, the Water Rights and the 
Irrigation Equipment prior to the date of signing thereof. The merger doctrine precludes any 
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prior or contemporaneous agreements related to the same prior to the execution date of the 
Warranty Deed. Thus, the District Court erred in holding that the transaction involving the 
transfer of the 147 Acres, the Water Rights and the Irrigation Equipment was anything less than 
a full and absolute conveyance of all of Hull's interest therein, whether legal, equitable or 
otherwise. 
C. Whether the District Court erred by fashioning a remedy for breach of contract 
when Hull had failed to sufficiently prove actual or anticipated damages with 
reasonable certainty and when the District Court's remedies were outside of the 
relief requested by Hull, unsupported by evidence in the record or were 
unreasonable, arbitrary and unenforceable. 
Given that Hull fully and absolutely conveyed all of his interest in and to the 147 Acres, 
the Water Rights and the Irrigation Equipment through execution and delivery of the Purchase 
and Sale Agreement and the Warranty Deed, an issue next arises concerning the dealings of the 
parties related to the subdivision and development of the 147 Acres. The District Court found 
that "the parties entered into a verbal agreement sometime after execution of the original real 
estate contract [January 10, 2005] and before March 2006 whereby Giesler agreed to give Hull a 
contingent 112 interest in the 147 parcel." (Memorandum Opinion at 5, R. at 192) (emphasis in 
original). As argued previously, the merger doctrine would preclude any agreement preceding 
the execution ofthe Warranty Deed.4 Therefore, the agreement, of necessity, must have been 
entered sometime between closing on April 21, 2005 and March 2006. 
4 To the extent that Respondent or the District Court propose that an oral agreement was entered in the interim time 
between execution of the Purchase and Sale Agreement and closing, and that agreement was not foreclosed by the 
merger doctrine, such agreement would fail for lack of additional consideration as Appellant already had the 
executed Purchase and Sale Agreement whereby Respondent had agreed to absolutely transfer any and all interest to 
the 147 Acres, the Water Rights and the Irrigation Equipment to Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 17 -
As found by the District Court, the parties' agreement relating to the subdivision and 
development of the 147 Acres lacked some specifics. (Memorandum Opinion at 8; R. at 195). 
Nevertheless, the District Court found that there was sufficient meeting ofthe minds to form a 
contract. Particularly, the District Court found as follows: 
An integral part of a contract is mutual consideration. Giesler's consideration for 
the agreement was the promise to develop the subdivision(s) at his cost (subject to 
reimbursement), contributing the 107 acres that he had paid for. Hull's 
consideration for the contract was his agreement to repay the [DL Evans Notes] as 
they became due in exchange for receiving 112 ofthe profits ofthe subdivision. 
Id. With this initial framework, the District Court then continued to apply the facts as found to 
fill in the necessary gaps in the parties' agreement. 
The District Court noted that the precise interest that Hull would have in the Property was 
one of the major areas lacking in mutual agreement. (Memorandum Opinion at 9; R. at 196). 
Hull claimed that he should be awarded a one-half interest in the land. Id. However, the District 
Court held that Hull had an equitable interest that was "not in the title to the property but rather 
in the profits that might be generated upon the sale of developed lots." (Memorandum Opinion 
at 10, R. at 197) (emphasis added). Subsequently, the District Court coined this interest as "a 
conditional undivided interest in the property but not an undivided legal interest." 
(Memorandum Opinion at 10, R. at 197) (emphasis added). Immediately thereafter the District 
Court clarified that it "finds and concludes that Hull has an equitable interest in the 107 acres in 
the form of an interest in profits, if any." (Memorandum Opinion at 11, R. at 198) (emphasis 
added). With regard to Hull's claims that the Property be held in trust or subject to another 
equitable remedy, the District Court held as follows: 
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Hull asks this Court to impose a resulting trust, express trust, implied trust, 
constructive trust on or to partition the remaining 107 acres. The Court finds it 
unnecessary to address any of these remedy requests. The Court has found that 
the parties have entered into an express contract whereby Giesler has a duty at his 
sole expense to develop the remaining 107 acres into saleable lots and as each lot 
sells to pay Hull his proportionate share of the net profits therefrom. Hull has a 
duty to pay the [DL Evans Notes] when due at the rate of $20,107.46 per year. 
Because the parties have an express contract governing their rights, it is not 
necessary for the Court to fashion a further remedy by way of these requested 
equitable remedies. 
(Memorandum Opinion at 30, R. at 217) (emphasis added). Accordingly, the evidence, as found 
by the District Court, supported a finding of express contract whereby Giesler would develop the 
Property and would split the net profits from the sale of each lot with Hull (after reimbursing its 
development costs), provided Hull paid the DL Evans Notes on time. 
This subdivision/development agreement was an express contract that was entirely 
separate from the underlying sale of the 147 Acres, the Water Rights and the Irrigation 
Equipment. Outside of the division of net profits from the sale of lots, there was no interest 
found by the District Court in and to the Property itself. Neither could any actual interest in the 
Property be found based on the parties' oral agreement, as such would run afoul of the statute of 
frauds, which was pled by Giesler as an affirmative defense. Idaho Code Section 9-505 provides 
that any agreement for the sale of real property, or "of an interest therein" must be in writing to 
be valid. Giesler conceded that Hull had an interest in the profits from the sale of subdivided lots 
ifhe paid the DL Evans Notes on time, but never an interest in the land. Because the District 
Court found that the parties' subdivision/development agreement was verbal, the statute of 
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frauds would preclude the agreement from creating any interest in the real estate, absent some 
equitable trust which the District Court denied. 
Having determined that the parties had agreed to an express subdivision/development 
contract, the District Court next found that both parties had breached the agreement-howbeit, 
neither breach being found to be material. (Memorandum Opinion at 14,20-21; R. at 201, 207-
08). Then, the District Court fashioned its own remedies without analyzing any evidence of 
damages. (Memorandum Opinion at 30-39; R. at 217-26). This was erroneous because "[i]t is 
well-established that equitable remedies will not be allowed if adequate remedies are available at 
law." Vreeken v. Lockwood Eng'g, B. V, 148 Idaho 89, 105,218 P.3d 1150, 1166 (2009) citing 
Meikle v. Watson, 138 Idaho 680, 683, 69 P.3d 100, 103 (2003). Additionally, the District Court 
held that no equitable remedies were appropriate because it found that an express contract 
existed. This is also noteworthy and erroneous because Hull failed to provide any evidence of 
actual or potential damages at trial, other than some payments that mayor may not have been 
intended to be for the DL Evans Notes.s (Memorandum Opinion at 12-18; R. at 199-205). The 
analysis of Hull's case against Giesler should have ended at that point when the District Court 
found that the parties entered into an express contract, because Hull had not sufficiently proven 
5 The District Court found one credit that Appellant gave to Respondent for the fIrst payment of the DL Evans Notes 
in 2006 in the amount of $20, 1 07.46. Regarding the other payments due under the DL Evans Notes, the District 
Court lumped all of Respondent's payments to Appellant, which did not contain a memo designation, together in a 
side by side comparison with what would be owed on the DL Evans Notes and other indebtedness at issue at trial 
and found that "Hull's assertion that he paid all of his obligations under the contract for the D.L. Evans loan is just 
as credible as Giesler's assertion that he did not." (Memorandum Opinion at 14, R. at 201). Aside from this 
holding, that they were just as likely payments on the DL Evans Notes as not, the District Court did not make 
specifIc fIndings as to how the undesignated payments are actually allocated. 
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any damages for breach of contract. In such cases, relief must be based on damages ascertained 
with reasonable certainty. 
In Harris, Inc. v. Foxhollow Constr. & Trucking, this Court affirmed a district court 
decision denying relief to a plaintiff who had failed to prove contractual damages with 
reasonable certainty. This Court held: 
"The burden is upon the plaintiff to prove not only that it was injured but that its 
injury was the result of the defendant's breach; both amount and causation must 
be proven with reasonable certainty." "Reasonable certainty" does not mean that 
damages need to be proven with "mathematical exactitude," but it does require a 
plaintiff to prove that damages are not merely speculative. 
Harris, Inc. v. Foxhollow Constr. & Trucking, 151 Idaho 761, 770,264 P.3d 400, 409 (2011) 
quoting Griffith v. Clear Lakes Trout Co., Inc., 143 Idaho 733, 740, 152 P.3d 604,611 (2007). 
Further, in Harris, this Court held that evidence that the plaintiffs damages were "around 
$147,000.00" was not reasonably certain. Id. Accordingly, Hull had the burden to prove his 
damages incurred as a result of any breach of the subdivision! development agreement. When he 
failed to sufficiently prove such damages with reasonable certainty, his case against Giesler, or at 
least the relief requested thereunder, should have failed. 
Regarding the types of damages available for breach of contract, the Idaho Court of 
Appeals has held that: 
[I]n general, when a contract has been breached, the aggrieved party may seek 
compensation for infringement upon any of three separate interests embodied in 
the contract. 
Judicial remedies ... serve to protect one or more of the following 
interests of [one who has been promised performance under a contract]: 
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(a) his "expectation interest," which is his interest in having the benefit of 
his bargain by being put in as good a position as he would have been in 
had the contract been performed, 
(b) his "reliance interest," which is his interest in being reimbursed for loss 
caused by reliance on the contract by being put in as good a position as he 
would have been in had the contract not been made, or 
( c) his "restitution interest," which is his interest in having restored to him 
any benefit that he has conferred on the other party. 
Brown v. Yacht Club, 111 Idaho 195, 198-99, 722 P.2d 1062,1065-66 (Ct. App. 1986) quoting 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 344 (1979). 
There certainly was no evidence as to what position Hull would have been in had the 
subdivision/development agreement been performed (Hull's expectation interest) or of amounts 
expended by Hull in reliance on expected benefit from the agreement (Hull's reliance interest). 
In addition, with regards to any benefit conferred to Giesler from Hull (Hull's restitution 
interest), the only evidence was a $20,107.46 credit on the DL Evans Notes and a couple of 
checks that the District Court found mayor may not have been intended for payment on the DL 
Evans Notes. (Memorandum Opinion at 14, R. at 201). It was error for the District Court to 
overlook this shortcoming in Hull's case and move on to fashioning its own remedies without 
reasonably certain evidence of damages. Without adequate proof of damages for breach of 
contract or evidentiary reasons as to the difficulty of ascertaining damages or the impossibility of 
affording adequate relief by legal damages, Hull's case against Giesler should have failed 
without further remedy. 
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Even if the District Court did not err by overlooking Hull's failure to present evidence of 
damages with reasonable certainty, it erred in fashioning remedies by creating additional terms to 
the parties' subdivision/development agreement, including arbitrary timetables and 
unenforceable penalties, inconsistent with applicable law and the relief requested by Hull. 
The District Court ordered as follows (as is pertinent to Giesler on this appeal): 
4. Giesler shall complete all infrastructure of what has been identified as 
Parcell, Parcel 2 and Parcel 3 in the Court's Findings by July 31,2014, July 
31,2015 and July 31, 2016 respectively at his sole expense such that every 
platted lot in every subdivision is marketable and in compliance with all zoning 
requirements of Twin Falls County unless Hull has forfeited his expectancy 
interest as defined in paragraphs 2 and 3 above. Giesler shall use all reasonable 
efforts to sell said lots in a commercially reasonable manner taking into 
consideration existing real estate marketing conditions. Upon sale of each lot he 
shall remit to Hull by cashier's check V2 of the net profits-pro rata---of each lot 
based upon development costs to date. The Court shall retain jurisdiction in this 
case to resolve any disputes concerning the calculation of net profit. Giesler shall 
not have the right to encumber the property without the mutual consent of 
the parties or Court order. 
5. If Giesler fails to timely develop each parcel described above then the 
following shall occur. 1) Hull shall be relieved of making any further 
payments to D.L. Evans bank; 2) all developed lots and any undeveloped 
land and any appurtenant water shares shall immediately be listed for sale 
with a reputable real estate brokerage (other than one in which either party 
has an interest) at fair market value and the net proceeds of sale after the 
payment of real estate commissions, closing costs, title insurance, etc) shall be 
divided equally between the parties, WITHOUT REIMBURSEMENT TO 
GIESLER FOR ANY PREVIOUS EXPENDITURES FOR 
DEVELOPMENT COSTS. The failure of Giesler to timely comply with the 
development criteria set forth above shall constitute a forfeiture of his right 
of reimbursement for development costs. If, upon this occurrence, there 
remains any farmable ground from the 107 acres, an independent third party shall 
farm the ground on a cash rent basis, the parties shall equally pay the costs ofthe 
farming venture and equally divide and [sic] net profits. 
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7. This Judgment shall be recorded and shall constitute an encumbrance 
upon the property identified in the above referenced Exhibit. The parties shall 
take all reasonable steps necessary to clear title for the benefit of a third party or 
lending institution from this judgment for all lots or acreage sold pursuant to this 
judgment. 
(Judgment at ~~ 4, 5, 7; R. at 231-32) (emphasis added) (caps emphasis in original). 
First, the District Court erred by fashioning the foregoing relief because neither party 
requested the relief granted, nor the type of relief granted-which appears to be specific 
performance. By the Amended Complaint, Hull requested the following in his prayer for relief: 
Count One: 
1. That Plaintiff be restored to his lease and possession of the real property 
in question immediately, or that an order to show cause be held to determine 
Plaintiffs right as a tenant for the farming season of2012. 
2. That Plaintiffbe awarded damages as pled above if possession is 
not immediately restored. 
Count Two: 
3. Declaring that said land was conveyed to Defendants in an express 
trust for the purpose of constructing and the selling of lots in a purposed 
subdivision on the property; 
4. Declaring that Plaintiff qualified as the beneficiary of said trust; 
5. Declaring that upon the completion of/or the stopping of work on 
the subdivision and the selling of lots thereof that the Defendants as trustee had a 
duty to convey legal title to said remaining property to Plaintiff for his one-half 
undivided interest therein; 
6. Directing Defendants to execute and deliver to Plaintiff 
conveyance of the legal title to a one-half undivided interest in the property 
remaining; 
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Count Three: 
7. That because of the oral agreement and dealings between Plaintiff 
and Defendants regarding said property, that there be declared a resulting trust in 
favor of Plaintiff for a one-half undivided interest in the remaining real property 
and the same be conveyed to him by Defendants. 
Count Four: 
8. Plaintiff asks the court to find that a constructive trust was created 
for the benefit of the Plaintiff and that he be entitled to his one-half undivided 
interest in said property and that the same be reconveyed to him by Defendants. 
Count Five: 
9. That the Court fine [sic] the parties had an implied contract in law 
that provided that Defendants as real tors and developers, develop the 147 acres 
into subdivisions, the first 40 acre subdivision having been completed, and 
Plaintiff retaining a one-half undivided interest in the whole property until it was 
all subdivided and to pay Plaintiff his one-half share of the market value when 
each subdivision was complete, Plaintiff having been compensated for the first 40 
acre subdivision. 
10. That the Court find that Defendants have failed to proceed as 
agreed past the first 40 acre subdivision in 2007 and refused to allow Plaintiff 
access to farm his one-half of the 107 acres. 
11. That Defendants unjustly retain Plaintiff's one-half share and are 
bound to return it to Plaintiff by partition or pay Plaintiff the current market value 
of his one-half share or interest. The amount to be determined at trial as well as 
the feasibility of partition of the land. 
Count Six: 
12. That Plaintiffbe reimbursed or paid by Defendants the following: 
a). $3,754.40 for Defendants share ofthe 2008 alfalfa seed 
expense. 
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b). The value of the one load of wheat that was delivered to Burley 
by Defendants in the fall of2012 that belonged to Plaintff-value to be established 
at trial. 
c). That Defendant refuses to sign on Plaintiff's Federal Crop 
Deficiency payment for the year 2012, damaging Plaintiff in excess of$5,300.00. 
(Amended Complaint at 11-13; R. at 142-44). 
Nowhere in Hull's long list of relief requested is there any mention of the relief the 
District Court granted or even the type of relief granted (apparently, specific perfonnance). The 
only equitable remedies raised by Hull concerned partition and his various theories of holding 
the Property in trust, which the District Court denied because it found that equitable remedies 
were inappropriate where there was an express contract. (Memorandum Opinion at 30, R. at 
217). Therefore, the District Court erred by fashioning these remedies. 
In MK. Transp. v. Grover, this Court held that LR.C.P. 15(b) does not allow a trial court 
to base its decision on an issue that was not tried by either express or implied consent of the 
parties. 101 Idaho 345, 349, 612 P.2d 1192, 1196 (1980). This Court held: 
The requirement that the unpleaded issues be tried by at least the implied consent 
of the parties assures that the parties have notice of the issues before the court 
and an opportunity to address those issues with evidence and argument. 
Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Further, this Court held that merely presenting 
evidence relevant to the unpleaded issue without objection was not sufficient to try the issue by 
implied consent, unless it appears that "the parties understood the evidence to be aimed at the 
unpleaded issue." Id. quoting MBI Motor Co., Inc. v. Lotus/East, Inc., 506 F.2d 709, 711 (6th 
Cir. 1974). "Where nothing in the record indicates that an unpleaded issue was litigated at trial, 
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it is error for the trial court to base its decision on the unpleaded issue." Id. In MK. Transp., 
there was evidence in the record that might have supported a finding of trial by consent, 
however, because it was also relevant to other claims tried by the parties, "it would be manifestly 
unjust for the court to decide the case on theories not considered by the parties which may be 
inferentially proven by the evidence." Id. at 350,612 P.2d at 1197. Accordingly, because Hull 
did not request the relief fashioned by the District Court, including the absence of an open-ended 
request for other relief, and the parties did not present evidence on the issue of specific 
performance in the absence of any sufficient evidence of damages, neither party was on notice of 
the potential for such relief and Giesler did not have an opportunity to present evidence to rebut 
it. Therefore, the District Court erred by including these remedies in the relief afforded to Hull. 
Second, even if the District Court could fashion remedies outside of the relief requested 
by Hull, the sale of the 147 Acres, Water Rights and Irrigation Equipment was absolute and 
without reservation according to the District Court's findings and applicable law. Additionally, 
the subdivision/development agreement was an express oral contract, entirely separate from the 
purchase and sale. Furthermore, as noted earlier, the District Court found that Hull had no 
interest to the title of the Property, only to one-half of the net profits from the sale of lots located 
in the future subdivision pursuant to the subdivision/development agreement. Yet, the District 
Court has erroneously fashioned remedies that bear directly upon Giesler's fee ownership 
interest in the land. Paragraph 4 of the Judgment provides that Giesler cannot further encumber 
the Property. Paragraph 5 of the Judgment provides that if Giesler does not complete 
development within the District Court's arbitrary timetables, that the Property will be sold. 
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Paragraph 7 of the Judgment provides that the Judgment itself shall be recorded and constitute an 
encumbrance on the Property. 
None of these remedies fashioned by the District Court are appropriate given that the sale 
ofthe Property was absolute. The District Court found that Hull only had an interest in one-half 
of the net profits from the sale of subdivided lots located on the Property, not the Property itself. 
However, these remedies purport to directly encumber Giesler's rights to use, encumber and 
transfer the land. These remedies run afoul of the District Court's previous holdings that the 
Purchase and Sale Agreement and Warranty Deed contained no other agreement and acted as an 
absolute transfer of the Property. 
Third, in addition to the District Court's error fashioning remedies that improperly 
impinge on Giesler's ownership rights in the Property, the remedies fashioned by the District 
Court also constitute an unenforceable penalty clause to the parties' oral subdivision! 
development agreement. This situation is unique in that the parties did not agree on penalties 
upon default oftheir oral subdivision!development agreement (presumably not foreseeing that 
the market would crash and make further development illogical). Rather, in this case the District 
Court erroneously formulated these penalties and included them as part of the parties' agreement. 
In addition to the penalties mentioned previously, paragraph 5 further provides that, upon failure 
of Giesler to meet the District Court's arbitrary timetables, Hull will no longer be required to 
make any payments on the DL Evans Notes and Giesler will forfeit the right to receive any 
reimbursement for development costs. 
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While contracting parties may mutually agree on reasonable liquidated damages clauses, 
this Court has held that: 
[W]here the forfeiture or damage fixed by the contract is arbitrary and bears no 
reasonable relation to the anticipated damage, and is exorbitant and 
unconscionable, it is regarded as a "penalty", and the contractual provision 
therefor is void and unenforceable. 
Schroeder v. Partin, 151 Idaho 471,476,259 P.3d 617,622 (2011) quoting Graves v. Cupic, 75 
Idaho 451, 456, 272 P.2d 1020, 1023 (1954). The penalties fashioned by the District Court in the 
portions of the Judgment quoted above, are arbitrary and bear no relation to anticipated damages 
because Hull did not present sufficient evidence of actual or anticipated damages at trial. The 
District Court simply inserted additional terms in the parties' subdivision/development 
agreement in order to force compliance and/or make the agreement more equitable in favor of 
Hull. However, this Court has held on numerous occasions that "[ c ]ourts do not possess the 
roving power to rewrite contracts in order to make them more equitable." Shawver v. 
Huckleberry Estates, L.L.c., 140 Idaho 354, 362, 93 P.3d 685, 693 (2004); see also City of 
Meridian v. Petra Inc., 299 P.3d 232,244 (2013). 
In Chandler v. Hayden, this Court considered the District Court's powers to reform a 
contract when the parties have not agreed upon an essential term. In dicta, this Court stated: 
[W]e emphasize that when reforming an instrument, the court gives effect to the 
contract that the parties did make, but that by reason of mistake was not expressed 
in the writing executed by them .... Thus, the district court is not free to 
reform the Agreement simply for the purpose of arriving at a result that is 
subjectively viewed as "fairer" to one of the parties. The district court has the 
power to reform a contract to avoid an unconscionable harm .... However, on 
remand, the district court should also be mindful that reformation is not 
appropriate simply because 'the contract produces a suboptimal or 
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inconvenient result, viewed in hindsight.' . .. In the absence of a rmding of 
unconscionability, or some other recognized ground for reformation, the 
district court erred in reforming the parties' Agreement. 
Chandler v. Hayden, 147 Idaho 765, 772, 215 P.3d 485, 492 (2009) (emphasis added) (citations 
omitted). This type of impermissible reformation is precisely what the District Court imposed in 
this case. The District Court found that the parties had an express oral contract to split the net 
profits of the sale of subdivided lots provided Hull paid the DL Evans Notes on time. Yet, 
because the District Court found that Giesler had not proceeded to develop the Property within a 
reasonable time, it imposed arbitrary future deadlines and severe penalties upon Giesler's future 
failure to perform. It reached this conclusion absent any evidence of unconscionability and with 
a only a slim showing, at best, of any damages suffered by Hull. 
The same analysis prohibiting the District Court from reforming the parties' agreement to 
include penalties equally applies to the District Court's imposition of performance timetables on 
the Giesler that are tied to those penalties. The District Court correctly noted that "[a]bsent the 
party's [sic] agreement, Idaho law imposes an obligation to perform within a reasonable time." 
(Memorandum Opinion at 20, R. at 207) citing Weinstein v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 
149 Idaho 299, 233 P.3d 1221 (2010). Giesler contends that the timetables imposed by the 
District Court are not reasonable. The only evidence found by the District Court of the 
reasonableness of the time required for development of the Property was (1) Hull's testimony 
"that each 'phase' of the development should have been completed every two to three years" 
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(Memorandum Opinion at 19; R. at 206)6; and (2) Giesler's testimony that he could "develop 
Parcell 'anytime.'" (Memorandum Opinion at 31; R. at 218). Parcell refers to the portion of 
the Property which Giesler had already platted, but for which he had not yet received a final plat 
from the County of Twin Falls because he had not begun infrastructure improvements. 
(Memorandum Opinion at 5, 18-19; R. at 192,205-06). Based only on these findings, the 
District Court held: 
Giesler has an obligation to develop the subdivision(s) within a reasonable time. 
He has testified that he can develop Parcell "anytime." The Court finds that 
development of Parcel 1 within one year from payment of Hull's outstanding 
obligation on the D.L. Evans loan is a "reasonable time." The Court further finds 
that development of Phase 2 within 2 years thereafter and that development of 
Phase 3 within 3 years thereafter are "reasonable" times given that this project is 
now into its eighth year. 
(Memorandum Opinion at 31; R. at 218). 
Giesler's testimony that he could commence development of Parcel 1 "anytime" is the 
only evidence in support of the District Court's conclusion and order that Giesler must complete 
the development by July 31,2014, or suffer severe penalties and forfeiture. There is no evidence 
in the record to support the District Court's conclusion and order that Giesler complete Phases 2 
and 3 by July 31, 2015 and July 31,2016, respectively, or suffer severe penalties and forfeiture. 
If Giesler had notice that he needed to provide evidence of reasonable future timetables for 
performance, he could have put together expert testimony to that effect. However, Giesler was 
6 Respondent testified to this timeframe despite the following testimony at trial during his direct examination: 
Q: Do you have any experience with subdivisions? 
A (Respondent): Not much. No. I'm familiar with what goes with them, just basic knowledge. 
(Tr. 06/04/13 P. 101 L. 20-23). 
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not aware of the need to produce such evidence-amounting to a defense to specific 
performance-in light of (1) Hull's failure to present sufficient evidence of reasonably certain 
damages and (2) Hull's failure to request this relief in the pleadings, as argued above. 
It is not reasonable for the District Court to impose these deadlines without any evidence 
of how long development takes. Furthermore, it is not reasonable to impose these rigid deadlines 
with no provision protecting Giesler from the severe penalties and forfeiture for noncompliance 
in the event of third party delays that are outside of Giesler's control. In any event, these are 
matters that could have and should have been tried before the District Court in order to come to 
an adequate conclusion of what would be a reasonable timeframe for development of the 
Property. Without any evidence of what would be a reasonable development timeframe, the 
District Court erred by imposing such a timeframe. 
Even construing the pleadings and the District Court's findings generously in favor of 
Hull, his case should have ended at his failure to present evidence of reasonably certain damages. 
If Hull's case survives that scrutiny, the District Court further erred by imposing additional 
remedial terms to the parties' subdivision/development agreement that were not supported by 
evidence in the record or applicable law because they were not requested by the pleadings, 
unreasonable, arbitrary or unenforceable penalty and forfeiture clauses. 
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D. Whether the District Court erred by only awarding Giesler one half of the value 
of the Irrigation Equipment and also ordering that the pro rata value of the 
Irrigation Equipment be factored into the calculation of "net profits" from the sale 
of subdivided lots. 
Giesler additionally contends that the District Court erred by only awarding half ofthe 
value ofthe Irrigation Equipment to Giesler and further including the pro rata value ofthe 
Irrigation Equipment in the net profits of each subdivided lot sold pursuant to the 
subdivision/development agreement. As it pertained to the net profits from the sale of 
subdivided lots, the District Court found as follows: 
[T]he Court finds that they agreed to equally split the net profits from the 
development. The Court further finds that the term net profits shall mean: the 
gross sales price of each lot less selling costs, less $2500 per acre (the original 
acquisition price of each acre), less the prorata share of development costs of each 
lot, plus the pro rata value of irrigation equipment that would have normally 
been liquidated as the farm ground was taken out of production and 
converted to housing lots. This conclusion does not foreclose consideration of 
other costs related to the development that may not be otherwise identified in this 
OpInIOn. 
(Memorandum Opinion at 11, R. at 198) (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). With regard to 
the irrigation equipment component, the District Court found, in a footnote, that "Giesler bought 
the acreage to subdivide it. The Court finds that the irrigation equipment should be deemed 
appurtenant to the property in the same manner as water shares and should be considered part of 
the value of the land that Giesler was to develop." (Memorandum Opinion at 11, n 11; R. at 
198). 
As to the value of the Irrigation Equipment, the District Court found that Hull sold 6 hand 
lines, 5500 feet of 10 inch mainline, 1490 feet of 6 inch mainline and 1075 feet of 4 inch 
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mainline to Giesler. (Memorandum Opinion at 25-26; R. at 212-213). The District Court found 
the value of this equipment to be $25,122. Id. The District Court also found that Hull removed 
the irrigation equipment from the Property in early 2012 and, therefore, owed Giesler damages 
for conversion. However, the District Court further held as follows: 
Had the irrigation equipment remained on the land, it would eventually have been 
sold as part ofthe "subdivision" development and 112 of the value thereof would 
belong to Hull. In other words that irrigation equipment would be part ofthe 
"gross" income generated by development ofthe subdivision .... Hull must 
reimburse Giesler for one half of that value. The damages to be awarded to 
Giesler do not total $25,122, but rather 112 ofthat sum or $12,561. 
(Memorandum Opinion at 26; R. at 213). 
The District Court's findings and conclusions regarding the damages for Hull's 
conversion of the Irrigation Equipment are erroneous. Giesler does not take issue with the 
District Court's factual determination of the value of the equipment, only with how the District 
Court applied that factual determination. First, the District Court halved the found value of the 
Irrigation Equipment. Then, the District Court held that the pro rata value of the Irrigation 
Equipment would be taken into effect when calculating the "net profits" from the sale of the 
subdivided lots. In essence, then, Giesler is paying back Hull twice over for the Irrigation 
Equipment that was sold to Giesler outright pursuant to the Purchase and Sale Agreement. 
The District Court previously held: 
The contract, warranty deed, and closing statement are unequivocal, and the Court 
finds as a fact and as a matter oflaw that all of Hull's legal interest in the 147 acre 
parcel, certain irrigation equipment and 147 water shares were transferred to 
Giesler as of closing on April 21, 2005. The integration clause in the written 
agreement clearly states that ... [other] agreements as asserted by Hull are 
disavowed by the contract and merged into the deed. 
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(Memorandum Opinion at 6, R. at 193) (emphasis added). The transfer of the Irrigation 
Equipment was absolute and Giesler owned the Irrigation Equipment free and clear as of the 
closing date of April 21, 2005. Therefore, the District Court erred by crediting half of the value 
of the Irrigation Equipment-or, $12,561.00-back to Hull. The entire amount of the value of 
the Irrigation Equipment, as found by the District Court-or, $25,122-should have been 
awarded to Giesler. 
Additionally, the District Court erred in applying the pro rata value of the Irrigation 
Equipment in the calculation of "net profits." In Rayl v. Shull Enterprises, this Court looked at 
three factors in determining whether a particular piece of irrigation equipment was to be 
considered a fixture: (1) whether it was annexed to the real property; (2) whether the equipment 
was specifically adapted or "peculiarly valuable" to that particular parcel of real property; and 
(3) the objective intent surrounding the installation of the piece of equipment. 108 Idaho 524, 
527-28, 700 P.2d 567, 570-71 (1984). 
The facts found by the District Court were that the Irrigation Equipment was movable. 
Hull stored irrigation equipment on the Property necessary to irrigate upwards of 700 additional 
acres of farm ground. (Memorandum Opinion at 3, 25-26; R. at 190,212-13). Additionally, 
Hull removed all ofthe irrigation equipment in 2012. (Memorandum Opinion at 3,25; R. at 190, 
212). There was no evidence that the parties ever intended that the pro rata value of the 
irrigation equipment would be considered in the calculation of "net profits" and such a holding is 
unreasonable and inconsistent with the District Court's holding that an absolute conveyance 
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occurred in 2005. The irrigation equipment belongs to Giesler and he can do whatever he wants 
with it-whether using it on another piece of ground or disposing of it in some other manner. 
That is his right incident to his outright ownership of the Irrigation Equipment. Further, under 
the Rayl factors, the equipment is not annexed to the land, it is not particularly adapted to special 
use unique to the Property, and it was not intended to be permanent. Accordingly, the District 
Court also erred by holding it was an appurtenance to the Property that had to be factored in the 
calculation of "net profits" as each subdivided lot was sold. 
VI. 
COSTS AND ATTORNEY'S FEES ON APPEAL 
Giesler seeks an award of its costs incurred in filing this appeal pursuant to the Purchase 
and Sale Agreement and Idaho law, including I.A.R. 40, and all reasonable attorney's fees 
incurred in pursuing this appeal pursuant the Purchase and Sale Agreement and Idaho law, 
including I.A.R. 41, I.e. § 12-120(3) and I.C. § 12-121. 
A. Purchase and Sale Agreement 
"Where there is a valid contract between the parties which contains a provision for an 
award of attorney fees and costs, the terms of that contractual provision establish a right to an 
award of attorney fees and costs." Farm Credit of Spokane v. W W Farms, Inc., 122 Idaho 565, 
836 P.2d 511 (1992) (emphasis added). Likewise, in Bolognese v. Forte, this Court held that 
attorney's fees on appeal could be awarded to a prevailing party pursuant to a purchase and sale 
agreement. 153 Idaho 857, 867, 292 P.3d 2481, 2491 (2012) citing Lindberg v. Roseth, 137 
Idaho 222, 233, 46 P.3d 518,529 (2002). 
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Paragraph 19 of the Purchase and Sale Agreement provides as follows: 
If either party initiates or defends any arbitration or legal action or proceedings 
which are in any way connected with this Agreement, the prevailing party shall 
be entitled to recover from the non-prevailing party reasonable costs and 
attorney's fees, including such costs and fees on appeal. 
(Giesler's Exhibit 4) (emphasis added). 
Hull brought this action against Giesler primarily alleging that the Purchase and Sale 
Agreement did not accomplish a full transfer of all of Hull's rights in and to the 147 Acres, the 
Water Rights and the Irrigation Equipment. Rather, Hull claimed that he maintained an interest 
in the title of the Property (either legal or equitable). Since the Purchase and Sale Agreement, by 
its terms, conveyed all interest in such property to Giesler, Hull's action presented a direct 
connection to the Purchase and Sale Agreement, directly implicating the terms on the face 
thereof as well as the integration clause and attorney's fees provision contained therein. 
Accordingly, upon finding that the Giesler is the prevailing party in these proceedings, Giesler 
respectfully requests that the Court also award its costs and attorney's fees incurred on appeal. 
B. Idaho Code § 12-120(3) 
Giesler also seeks attorney's fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-120(3), which provides, in 
pertinent part, as follows: 
In any civil action to recover on ... [ a] contract relating to the purchase or sale of 
... goods, wares, merchandise ... and in any commercial transaction .•. , the 
prevailing party shall be allowed reasonable attorney's fees to be set by the 
court, to be taxed and collected as costs. 
Idaho Code § 12-120(3) (emphasis added). 
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In this matter, the disputes centered around two agreements constituting commercial 
transactions. First, Hull sold 147 acres of real property, including water shares and irrigation 
equipment to Giesler pursuant to the terms of a "Commercial/Investment Real Estate Purchase 
and Sale Agreement." Second, Hull and Giesler entered into an oral agreement to subdivide and 
develop the real property and to split the net profits from the sale of subdivided lots. As such, 
Giesler contends that these were commercial transactions. Upon a finding that Giesler was the 
prevailing party on appeal, Giesler respectfully requests and award of its costs and attorney's 
fees pursuant to this section. 
C. Idaho Code § 12-121 
Giesler also seeks an award of attorney fees pursuant to I. C. § 12-121. Attorney fees 
under I.C. § 12-121 are appropriate if an appeal has been brought or defended frivolously, 
unreasonably, or without foundation. See Crowley v. Critchfield, 145 Idaho 509, 514, 181 P.3d 
435, 440 (2007). 
In this case, Hull has alleged that he has an ownership interest in one-half ofthe Property, 
which is plainly contrary to the executed Purchase and Sale Agreement, the Warranty Deed and 
applicable law. Furthermore, Hull either brought this action prematurely or completely failed to 
prove up his damages at trial, instead contending that he be deeded back one-half ofthe Property, 
all of which were contrary to applicable law. 
Based on the foregoing, Giesler respectfully contends that Hull's efforts to bring this 
action against Giesler were unreasonable, frivolous and without foundational support in law or 
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fact. Accordingly, Giesler requests that the Court award its attorney's fees incurred in this 
matter pursuant to this section. 
VII. 
CONCLUSION 
The District Court erred insomuch as it held that Hull retained any interest in the 147 
Acres, the Water Rights and the Irrigation Equipment on the grounds that such a holding was 
inconsistent with the Purchase and Sale Agreement, the Warranty Deed and applicable law. The 
Purchase and Sale Agreement and Warranty Deed contained no indication of any retained 
interest or other agreement between the parties on their face and the integration clause in the 
Purchase and Sale Agreement together with the merger doctrine foreclose the possibility of any 
other understanding. 
The District Court also erred by inserting additional remedial terms into the parties' 
subdivision/development agreement without basis in fact or law. Namely, (1) the District Court 
erred by fashioning a remedy that was outside of the scope of the pleadings; (2) the District 
Court erred by fashioning any remedy at all when Hull failed to sufficiently prove actual or 
anticipated damages; (3) the District Court erred by including arbitrary timetables for Giesler's 
future performance without any evidentiary support that such timetables were reasonable; and (4) 
the District Court erred by including severe penalty and forfeiture clauses upon Giesler's failure 
to meet the District Court's timetables for performance as these clauses constituted 
unenforceable penalties and were improperly tied to Giesler's fee interest in the real property. 
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Lastly, the District Court erred in its application and apportionment of the value of the 
Irrigation Equipment. Namely, the District Court erred by awarding Giesler only half of the 
found value of the Irrigation Equipment, which was inconsistent with the District Court's 
holding that Hull's entire interest in the Irrigation Equipment was purchased by Giesler free and 
clear as of the closing date in 2005. Additionally, the District Court erred by factoring the pro 
rata value of the Irrigation Equipment into the determination of "net profits" as this was not 
supported by any evidence in the record, inconsistent with applicable law holding that such 
irrigation equipment was not appurtenant to the land and inconsistent with Giesler's outright 
ownership interest in the Irrigation Equipment. 
For the foregoing reasons, Giesler respectfully requests that this Court (1) reverse the 
District Court insomuch as it held that Hull retained any interest in the 147 Acres, the Water 
Rights or the Irrigation Equipment; (2) dismiss all affirmative relief to Hull and clear title to the 
Property; and (3) vacate such portions of the Judgment as require future performance of Giesler 
and which impose penalties or forfeiture for non-compliance, namely paragraphs 4, 5 and 7 
thereof, and remand with instructions to enter judgment against Hull for failure to prove actual or 
anticipated damages with reasonable specificity as well as reasonable development timeframes. 
In the alternative to the latter, Giesler requests that the Court vacate paragraphs 4,5 and 7 of the 
Judgment insomuch as they constitute unreasonable, arbitrary and unenforceable additional 
terms to the parties subdivision! development agreement. Lastly, the Giesler requests that the 
Court reverse the District Court's order granting only half of the value of the Irrigation 
Equipment to Giesler and requiring that the pro rata value of the Irrigation Equipment be 
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factored into the calculation of "net profits" and remand with instructions to enter judgment in 
favor of Giesler for the entire found value of the Irrigation Equipment and striking the pro rata 
value of the Irrigation Equipment from the calculation of "net profits." 
Oral argument is requested. 
DATED this 9th day of January, 2014. 
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